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LAWYERS IN THE STATION HOUSE?
(Comments upon The Supreme Court And The Police: A Police Viewpoint,
by Vincent L. Broderick)
ROBERT E. ENGLISH*
As a state court judge, I should like to comment
at the outset upon the impact which has been made
by the Escobedo decision' on the state courts. Thus
far it has been surprisingly moderate in relation to
the determination of actual cases, but there is, of
course, deep concern over developments in the law
which may lie just around the corner. This concern
is shared about equally, I believe, by those whose
anticipation is laced with alarm, and those who
already find ground for satisfaction and hopefully
look for more. For, surely, the existing large-scale
involvement with the problems of police investigation could only have been occasioned by the dicta
and not the decision, itself, in the Escobedo case.
Since Escobedo there have been a number of cases
around the country in which precisely opposite results have been reached on application of the fringe
features of the Escobedo opinion. These differences
have arisen, I would say, from conflicting judicial
points of view as to the appropriate function of the
lower courts in relation to the Supreme Court.
Some, recognizing the law as it existed prior to
Escobedo, have refused to depart therefrom in cases
distinguishable from Escobedo on the facts. They
have thus left the admissibility of confessions
unchanged except for cases which might fall within
the strict confines of the Escobedo decision.
An example of such a holding is People v. Hartgraves2 in which the Illinois Supreme Court held
that rejection of a confession elicited through police
interrogation was not required, because the accused had not requested the assistance of counsel.
And this, even though the defendant had been
given no warning that his confession might be
used against him, no advice that he had a right to
legal counsel, and no advice concerning his right
to remain silent. United States v. Cone,3 decided en
banc by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir* justice of the Appellate Court of Illinois, First
District.
1 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
231 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E. 2d 33 (1964), cert. denied
380 U.S. 961 (1965).
3United States v. Cone, 354 F. 2d 119 (2d Cir. 1965).

cult, is another case to the same general effect, but
for varying reasons expressed by several judges in
concurring opinions. The New Jersey opinion in
State v. Taylor4 is also of interest on this point.
Other courts, notably California' and the Third
Circuit,' apparently concluding that they perceived
a trend in the law, have sought to anticipate the
next moves of the Supreme Court in line with the
dicta in Escobedo. They have held, therefore, that
failure of an accused to request counsel when questioned by the police did not distinguish the case
from Fscobedo. They held further that this constitutional right to counsel precludes use of incriminating statements elicited by police questioning
unless the right is waived; and that it cannot be
intelligently waived unless the accused is informed
of both his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel.
As to which judicial approach is preferable, I
would not hesitate to put in with the Supreme
Court of Illinois. I should not want to participate
in the release of a convicted defendant on the basis
of what the Supreme Court of the United States
might do in the circumstances were such a case to
be presented to it, and then find out later that the
Court was disinclined to go quite that far. As to
which decisions will ultimately turn out to be the
law, however, I suspect nobody knows, not even
7
the Supreme Court justices themselves.
In commenting upon Mr. Broderick's talk, I
would never be so brash as to try to tell Mr.
Broderick anything about the administration of a
police force, and I agree with many of his statements. He has stated admirably, I think, the goal
of the police as being the maintenance of a climate
within which the liberties of a citizen may properly
be exercised. Mr. Broderick, however, appears to
446 NJ. 316, 217 A. 2d 1 (1966).

People v. Dorado,42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P. 2d 361
(1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965).
6United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.
2d 429 (3rd Cir. 1965).
7 Since this paper was delivered the issue has been
decided in Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
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me to be either disarmingly ingenuous or unnecessarily generous when he says that "we in law enforcement should accept enthusiastically the
principle which underlies (the Escobedo case)."
He seems to be, and I am sure he must be, convinced of the essentiality of pre-arraignment police
interrogation. Yet he attributes to the Supreme
Court "an intense concern for consideration of the
due administration of justice," equating the term
"administration of justice" in this context to the
other pan of the scales in contradistinction to the
"rights of individuals". I do not join him in reading
that degree of concern on the part of the Court into
the Escobedo opinion. I see, instead, a threat
(which, of course, may not materialize) to exalt the
newly recognized right to counsel to a level at
which it could very easily eliminate altogether
any meaningful police interrogation of an accused.
Nor do I believe that the Court's majority would be
intensely or even sorrowfully concerned over the
passing of this important phase of crime detection.
I refer, in part, to these words of Justice Goldberg:
... no system of criminal justice can, or
should, survive if it comes to depend for its
continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving
should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become
aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with
that system.8
Compare these statements with the understanding
of police problems expressed by the Court only a
9
short time before in Ciceniav. Lagay:
On the one hand, it is indisputable that the
right to counsel in criminal cases has a high
place in our scheme of procedural safeguards.
On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that
adoption of petitioner's position [that any
state denial of a defendant's request to confer
with counsel during police questioning violates due process] would constrict state police
activities in a manner that in many instances
might impair their ability to solve difficult
cases. A satisfactory formula for reconciling
these competing concerns is not to be found in any
broad pronouncement that one must yield to the
8 Escobedo, supra note 1 at 490.
9 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958).

other in all instances. Instead,
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. . . this Court,
in judging whether state prosecutions meet the
requirements of due process, has sought to
achieve a proper accommodation by considering a defendant's lack of counsel one pertinent
element in determining from all the circumstances whether a conviction was attended by
fundamental unfairness. (Emphasis added.)
Now, I grant that to translate Justice Goldberg's language into an admonishment that police
questioning will be done away with, I must attach
great significance to an accused's right to counsel.
And I do-very great. I also foresee far more serious consequences of the policeman's warning the
accused of that right than do either Mr. Broderick
or Professor Packer.
Returning for a moment to the newly recognized
prearraignment right to counsel, there can be no
doubt that we will here be dealing with a completely new field of experience for police administrators. The discovery of this right (together with
its exclusionary sanction) was remarkable, indeed,
in view of the language of the sixth amendment declaring the right to exist "in all criminal prosecutions", with 175 years of acceptance of the original
meaning of that term as indicating ordinarily the
proceedings commenced by indictment but not
earlier than the magistrate's hearing. As stated by
0
the Second Circuit in the Cote case,' "Text, conlead to the
amendment
sixth
of
the
history
text and
conclusion that the framers were addressing themselves to judicial proceedings, where a person is
obliged to defend himself in a process fraught with
the technicalities and procedural niceties of the
criminal law."
Historically, I am sure that the drafters of the
Illinois constitution of 1818 considered they were
declaring a right essentially the same as that in the
sixth amendment when they wrote' that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to
be heard by himself and counsel .. .. " (Emphasis
added.) Approximately the same language was
carried forward into the Illinois constitution of
1848." Our current constitution, which was
adopted in 1870, provides,1 3 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel. ... " (Emphasis added.) There is no doubt in my mind that

10Cone, supra note 3 at 123.

n Const. Art. VIII, §9 (1818).
12 Const. Art. XIII, §9 (1848).
" Const. Art. HI, §9 (1870).
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the words "appear and defend" apply exclusively
to judicial proceedings.
In the matter of "original meaning" of constitutional terms as contrasted with a later expanded
interpretation of the same language, I should like
to read to you the comments of one of the Supreme
Court justices as expressed in his dissenting
opinion:
The Court's justification for consulting its
own notions rather than following the original
meaning of the Constitution, as I would, apparently is based on the belief of the majority
of the Court that for this Court to be bound by
the original meaning of the Constitution is an
intolerable and debilitating evil; that our Constitution should not be 'shackled to the political theory of a particular era,' and that to
save the country from the original Constitution the Court must have constant power to
renew it and keep it abreast with this Court's
more enlightening theories of what is best for
our society. It seems to me that this is not only
an attack on the great value of our Constitution itself but also on the concept of a written
constitution which is to survive through the
years as originally written unless changed
through the amendment process which the
Framers wisely provided. Moreover, when a
'political theory' embodied in our Constitution
becomes outdated, it seems to be that a majority of the nine members of this Court are
not only without constitutional power but are
far less qualified to choose a new constitutional
political theory than the people of this country
proceeding in the manner provided by Article
Vall
It impresses me that this comment may be more
appropriate or less so, depending upon the particular language of the constitution which is under
consideration. I cannot disagree with the cliche
that the constitution must be interpreted by the
courts as a "living document", competent to cope
with the changed conditions of the twentieth vis-avis the eighteenth century. Thus, for example, it
seems to me only reasonable that the term, "commerce among the several states", should have taken
on by now a new interpretive meaning which could
not possibly have been contemplated in 1789, because the extent and the very character of commerce today were themselves unforeseeable. But
14Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383

U.S. 663, 677-78 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).

when it comes to constitutional language employing the terms which were used to declare the right
of an "accused" to have the "assistance of counsel
for his defense" in "criminal prosecutions", the
factual background of 1966 is not substantially
different from that which existed at the time when
the constitution was drafted. We had then, as we
have now, interrogation of suspects, both investigatory and accusatory. We had, and still have,
arrest, custody, indictment, criminal prosecution,
public jury trial, etc. Neither the circumstances
nor the consistent application of the constitutional
language changed appreciably in 175 years. What,
then, was the reason for changing the original
meaning of the words "criminal prosecution" in the
context of the Sixth Amendment? justice Black's
criticism of the Court's departure from "original
meaning", which I read to you from his dissent in
the Virginia Poll Tax case, would seem to have
especial relevance and significance. So we turn to
the Escobedo opinions to see how sharply Justice
Black must have dealt with the majority there,
only to find, of course, that he had joined in the
opinion of Justice Goldberg. Could this, then, have
been just another result-oriented decision?
Earlier courts might be forgiven their inability
to discern so important a constitutional right as
that declared in Escobedo when it is borne in mind
that they were looking only for factors which, in
"the totality of the circumstances"' 5 , might establish that an inculpatory statement had been made
voluntarily or involuntarily. As recently stated by
Justice Frankfurter for the court in Cidombe v.
Connecticut: "The ultimate test remains that which
has been the only clearly established test in AngloAmerican courts for two hundred years: the test of
voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be
used against him. If it is not, if his will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends
6
due process."'
A great many tests were developed judicially
through the years to assist the courts of this
country in determining whether or not a confession
was voluntary. I shall not take time to detail them.
Within these guidelines the law enforcement
agencies were given the opportunity to preserve
1- Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957); see
also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
'6367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
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the security of society and maintain "a climate of
law and social order". Certainly there were deplorable violations, but I submit that their remedy
lay in enforcing the established voluntary-involuntary rules, or amending or extending them, not in
pulling out of the hat, as it were, a completely new
exclusionary principle. I think that there had been
a very considerable promise for the improvement
of law enforcement attendant upon the increased
attention being given to the burgeoning problems
of the burgeoning urban and metropolitan areas,
but if the dicta of Escobedo are to become law, I
would not be so sanguine. In that event, I should
judge, the delicate balance, so long sought, between
the rights of the individual and the safety of the
public, would be drastically and dramatically
upset.
I suppose this makes me a prophet of doom in the
eyes of many. I noticed a recent piece by Professor
Kamisar in the publication of American Trial
Lawyers in which he cautioned against heeding
those who counselled that we were losing ground in
"the war against crime".' 7 If I understood his point
correctly, it was that such people should be ignored,
partly because they "have always insisted that
traditional safeguards are no longer necessary in
'modern times'" (a point which obviously does not
apply to those who are perturbed about Escobedo);
and partly because there had been people like them
in every decade of this century. Implicit in such an
argument, of course, is the cheering thought that
the premise on which such fears are based does not
in fact exist; that we are actually winning "the
war against crime", and have been doing so right
along. It appears that Professor Kamisar and I
have not been living in, or visiting, or reading
about the same cities, or studying the same statistics. If crime in general, and unpunished crime
in particular, have not shown an increase by any
and all standards during recent decades I shall be
happy to yield the point.
In most of what I have read on assessment of the
situation existing since Escobedo, I have found an
excess of self-chastisement, for I consider pejorative comments about the police to be, essentially,
self-deprecation. This seems to be the vogue in
other fields, too, as demonstrated by the many
public, though unofficial, efforts to place or accept
the blame for the president's assassination.
'TKamisar, Courts Must Not Yield To Prophets Of

Doom In Crime Crisis Battle, Am. TRIAL LAW. 14,

December-January, 1966.
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It is popular these days to run down many of the
principles and institutions which have proved their
value in the past. Collective guilt is in; community
pride is out. Aside from being exaggerated, and, to
that extent, wrong, I believe that criticism of the
police at this time is more than a little anachronistic. It is somewhat akin to deploring the sweatshops, the 12-hour day, and starvation wages. Certainly there are, and, I am afraid, will continue to
be, instances of "police brutality" and places where
such activities are countenanced. In making generalized criticism of these isolated cases, however,
there is a real possibility that we may carry the
theme too far, and in the wrong places, to the hurt
of all public safety.
While on a discouraging note, I might mention
that I do not share fully Mr. Broderick's optimism
that the Escobedo rule will not be given retroactive
effect. I am aware of the Walden,18 Wade,19 and
Negri'Oopinions which refuse to make retrospective
application, and the weight of authority so far is in
that direction. But Russou inferentially held to the
contrary, and there could be room for holding that
the "purpose of the rule" encompasses more than a
purely deterrent principle and might extend to "the
very integrity of the fact-finding process"." The
dissenting opinion in Negri"2 is a very thoughtful
expression of that point of view.
I heartily agree with Mr. Broderick's proposal
that law enforcement agencies should proceed constructively with the gathering of presently unavailable data relating to police problems which will or
may develop under Escobedo. I should like to suggest a pilot project or two.
The first arises from the position taken by the
Second Circuit in the Cone case concerning the
moment of crossover from investigatory to accusatory questioning by the police. Judge Lumbard
there stated:
It has been suggested that the process of
questioning suspects may be dissected into
"investigatory" and "accusatory" phases and
that certain legal conclusions, such as whether
the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel "attaches" and requires that the suspect be advised of his rights to silence and counsel, should
flow from a judicial finding that police ques1'Walden v. Pate, 350 F. 2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965).
9 Wade v. Yeager, 245 F. Supp. 67 (1965).
20 Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A. 2d 670 (1965).
" Russo, supra note 6.
22 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
supra note 20 at 677.
2regri,
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tioning has passed beyond mere investigation.
We do not consider this a realistic doctrine for
most cases. It was not the job of the agents
questioning Cone, nor were they qualified to
make nice decisions about the sufficiency of the
evidence they possessed; nor could they at the
time of arrest determine what charges should
be formally made and against whom. Agents
in hot pursuit of those whom they have reason
to believe may be implicated in a crime which
has just been discovered cannot be required
'on the spot' to decide difficult questions of the
sufficiency and quantum of proof.
We think a judicial inquiry into whether the
agents were still in the 'investigatory' stage
when they arrested Cone, and whether what
had started out as an investigation had
reached the "accusatory" stage when Cone
was questioned immediately after his arrest,
would serve no useful purpose.... To make
judicial assessment of the questioning process
turn on whether questioning occurred when a
case was no longer in the "investigatory" stage
and had entered the "accusatory" stage would
force police officers to make momentary and
critical decisions so unrelated to the actualities of law enforcement that the entire police
function might well be significantly undermined or demoralized. s4
Sympathetic as I am toward this statement, I
respectfully submit that it impresses me as a sort of
rear-guard action which is not likely to prevail. In
any event, it would be in keeping with Mr. Broderick's suggestions if a project were undertaken to
develop a workable answer (if one is possible) to
this extremely difficult police problem; the more so
since it does at the moment seem extremely unrealistic.
Such a project might also include a factual
study of the practical experience in England under
the Judges' Rules,25 about which there have been
such conflicting reports. To the extent that they
may have proved workable, other than through
their circumvention, it may be because they do not
include the right to, or appointment of counsel at
the police interrogation stage. What they do require is that when the police have decided to charge
a suspect he may not be questioned further unless
he is cautioned that he need say nothing and that
24 Cone, supra note 3 at 123.
25 The origin and development of the Judges' Rules
are traced by Justice Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 593-598 (1961).

what he does say may be used in evidence. These
Rules, which were promulgated in 1912, do not
have the effect of law, but there is no question
about their having influenced greatly the administration of criminal law in England even without
our exclusionary rule as to illegally obtained evidence. It is interesting to note that the discouragement which the Rules afforded to the questioning
of a suspect in custody was largely removed by
amendment in 1964, and such interrogation is now
expressly authorized. This, incidentally, is a move
which is counter to the trend we are experiencing,
and the factual background which prompted the
change ought to make an interesting study.
If our Supreme Court were to decide a case
based factually upon the full stretch of its Escobedo
proclamation concerning right to counsel, it would,
of course, have the effect of law. Thus the Court
might already be embarked upon a course which
would preempt the field otherwise available for the
development of American Judges' Rules based
upon the type of warnings given to an accused in
England. Furthermore, the English Rules bear
basically upon the voluntary-involuntary test, a
standard which has now lost its primacy in this
country, and may turn out to have less and less
relevance.
I can understand Mr. Broderick's wish that "the
constitutional focus of the Court should be on
whether or not, in light of all the circumstances, the
statements elicited from the defendant are voluntary", but I believe the Escobedo opinion effectively discarded that criterion. There is no reas6n
to believe that Escobedo's confession was not voluntary. Justice Goldberg did not say that denial of
consultation with counsel had rendered the confession involuntary. And Justice Stewart spoke
correctly, I think, when he said, "The confession
which the Court today holds inadmissible was a
26
voluntary one".
A few further words about the warnings to be
given by a policeman to his accused. It may well be
that the person about to be questioned will have
the right to have the policeman advise him that he
has the right to refrain from answering questions,
the right to his own counsel, the right to have
counsel assigned under certain circumstances, the
right to be told that whatever he may say could be
used in evidence against him, and the right to
waive any or all these rights if he wants to do so. It
may be, however, that he will have the right to
2

s6
.scobedo, supranote 1 at 494.
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have a lawyer tell him that he has the right to
waive these rights. It could get mighty complicated, and it would appear extremely probable that
in some cases erroneous legal advice would be given
by a policeman who would ordinarily not be licensed to practice law. I am not suggesting that the
courts would proceed against a lay policeman for
the illegal practice of law on the basis of his having
done what the courts have indicated he must do if
he is to obtain a usable confession. I do point out,
however, that a suspect could hardly have a more
unlikely or inappropriate source of legal advice
than the officer who at that time would presumably be taking affirmative action to secure the
evidence necessary for the suspect's conviction.
I seriously believe that the most important project for all of us to contemplate is the one which will
face the police questioner when the right to counsel,
about which the accused has been warned, materializes into a real live lawyer at the station house
representing his client during the accusatory interrogation. I cannot understand why it is that so
much of the thought and effort being devoted to
procedures for the warning stages is apparently
being done in the expectation that the questioning
may then proceed and that the right to counsel will
not be exercised.
Having proclaimed that the stage of accusatorial interrogation is that at which legal aid and
advice are most critical to an accused, I cannot
foresee the court's retracting these brave, new
words and retracting with them this newly-determined constitutional right. If that be correct, then
it is equally difficult for me to foresee application
of the rule only to persons able to retain their own
attorneys. I agree with Justice White's conclusion
that such a forecast would be naive.27 It would
then become a certainty that the right of an indigent defendant to assigned counsel at his trial
29

28
would be advanced by way of Gideon, Escobedo,

and the sixth amendment to the protection of an
accused during interrogation at the police station.
The new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
proposed to become effective July 1 of this year,
provide that "every defendant who is unable to
obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the
commissioner or the court through appeal, unless
27 Id. at 495.
v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2Gideon
2Escobedo, supra note 1.
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he waives such appointment". (Rule 44.) The right
to assigned counsel will thus no longer be related
to financial inability to pay. Also, the right, which,
under present rules, commences upon appearance
in court, will, in the future, apply before the commissioner as well. And the commissioner will then,
for the first time, be required to inform the defendant "of his right to request the assignment of
counsel... ". (Rule 5.) That counsel may have to
be assigned at a still earlier stage was recognized in
the Advisory Committee's Notes to the proposed
rule which state, "These rules do not cover procedures other than those in the courts of the United
States and before United States commissioners....
Hence, the problems relating to the providing of
counsel prior to the initial appearance before a
court or commissioner are not dealt with in this
rule. Cf. Escobedo ...

"

In February, 1966 the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants recommended approval of certain Revised Standards for Defender Services. They provide, in part, that persons without financial means
to secure competent counsel, when charged with an
offense carrying the possibility of a jail sentence,
should be provided with legal representation "immediately after the taking into custody or arrest."30
These standards are the work of the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association which adopted them
last November. We should note that if these standards are met, they would go far toward giving substance to the concern of justice White that the
Escobedo rule will be "wholly unworkable and
impossible to administer unless police cars are
equipped with public defenders". 3 '
The Illinois Public Defender Act became law in
1933. Thus Illinois was one of the enlightened
states which anticipated Gideon v. Wainwright by
a good many years. The statute provides that the
Public Defender is to appear before the court for
criminal defendants who are found by the court to
be unable to employ counsel. There is, therefore, no
authority for the Public Defender to represent an
accused at any stage earlier than his first appearance in court. The statutory authority of the Public
Defender to represent a defendant in court is also
subject to the direction of the court. In practice he
does not appear for any defendant except by ap20 American Bar Association, Recommendation Concerning Revised Standards For Civil Legal Aid and Defender Services, February, 1966---No. 45.
31 Escobedo, supra note 1 at 496.
2Gideon, supra note 28.
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pointment of the court and then only after the
court has conducted an inquiry to determine the
defendant's indigence.
Assuming that the authority of the Public Defender were extended so that he would somehow be
designated to represent criminal suspects at the
police station, he would require a tremendously increased staff. In a place such as Cook County, Illinois, I can think of no satisfactory solution to this
personnel problem other than to have an Assistant
Public Defender assigned to each police station
in the county to which suspects are customarily
brought for questioning at any and all times of
day and night. On this hypothesis, the service
of the Public Defender's Office would require
three assistants at each station, on eight-hour
shifts. The volume of business at many of the
Chicago police stations would unquestionably require more.
There are in Cook County 137 such police stations, including those of the Chicago and suburban
police departments, the Sheriff, and the Illinois
State Police. I would estimate that at least 500
Assistant Public Defenders would be required for
this purpose. Assuming a minimum salary of
$7,500, the staffing of these positions would cost
the county almost $4,000,000 annually, without
making any allowance for office space, desks or
stenographic help. And this would be only for
services commencing with the suspect's appearance
at the station. It would not contemplate that interrogation requiring counsel could, and probably
would, take place before that time.
Considering this situation a little further, it
would seem to me inescapable that the policy of
such a Public Defender staff (or the policy of any
lawyer, for that matter) would be to advise the
client not to answer any questions. Justice Jackson
cogently stated this fact of legal life in his opinion
in Watts v. Indiaian where he said:
...To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to
solution of the crime, because, under our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty is
to protect his client-guilty or innocent-and
that in such a capacity he owes no duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem.
Under this conception of criminal procedure,
any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in
no uncertain terms to make no statement to
police under any circumstances. (Emphasis
added.)
- 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949).

I can assure you that, whatever the situation
might be elsewhere, in Chicago every lawyer is
"worth his salt". There would be no questions
answered by a suspect in the presence of his counsel, except in so far as the latter might want him to
make an exculpatory statement of some kind. If
that were true, there would be no admissions or
confessions. I would even predict that if incriminating answers were given by a suspect with his attorney present under these circumstances, a point
would be raised by post-conviction petition alleging that incompetency of counsel had deprived the
defendant of the effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed to him by the sixth amendment. And
we would then be right back where we started.
Now, I don't think that $4,000,000 or anything
like that amount would be budgeted in Cook
County when its effect would be merely to guarantee that the police would not elicit confessions
through interrogation. It would be much simpler
and cheaper to direct the police not to take any
confessions. This would probably mean the
termination of all questioning at the moment of
suspicion, since that would be the point at which,
by hindsight, it would probably be determined
that the right to counsel attached, and no officer
could be certain in advance that he could safely
maintain the line between investigatory and accusatory interrogation. Thus the time and effort
of the police saved by contraction of the questioning procedures, and augmented by the funds otherwise required for the furnishing of counsel to indigent suspects, could be spent in developing and
perfecting other methods of crime detection-an
area which, I think law enforcement officials would
be the first to admit, could stand some improvement. This is the area, too, which Justice Goldberg
was describing when he said in Escobedo.3
Nothing we have said today affects the
powers of the police to investigate "an unsolved crime,"... by gathering information
from witnesses and by other "proper investigative efforts" (citing Spano35 and Haynes3 ).
Surely, the Court's suggestion falls in the category of things more easily said than done. What the
results of such a limited detection process would be,
I suspect no one can foretell. It seems obvious,
though, that fewer crimes would be solved than if
both lines of investigation could with propriety be
4 Escobedo, supra note 1 at 492.
15Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959).
36 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
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pursued simultaneously toward the perfection of
each. Were it to be possible to acquire and maintain an adequate control over crime without the
questioning of suspects, we would then, of course,
enjoy the best of both worlds, for I know of none
who considers desirable the least infringement of
individual liberties except when demanded for the
common good.
Most of what I have discussed relates to the
greatest imponderable for law enforcement agencies in the entire Escobedo situation, namely, the
results which would follow if appointment of
counsel were required for the interrogation of

suspects. I realize that the majority of commentators on this point state or imply that this win not
take place. I am simply not sure that it won't. In
the words of Justice Stewart, "I can only hope we
have completely misunderstood what the Court
has said"37 .
In conclusion, I consider it extremely important
that we all recognize the crescendo of conflict between law enforcement and civil lilberty, for only
then will we be made aware of the absolute necessity for resolving that conflict.
37Escobedo,

supra note 1 at 495.

